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A trio of recent United States court decisions has caused a
flutter in the arbitration community, in that these decisions are
inconsistent with accepted views of how enforcement of interna-
tional arbitral awards is supposed to work.1
Two of the decisions run counter to a central claim of interna-
tional arbitration, which is that enforcement of arbitral awards-
even those originating in other countries or legal systems-is
summary, simple, and more readily obtainable than enforcement
of foreign court judgments.2 These two decisions permitted the
respondents to avoid enforcement actions based on purely proce-
dural objections.
In the first decision, Base Metal Trading, Ltd. v. OJSC
"Novokuznetsky Aluminum Factory," the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ruled that, contrary to common
impression, a claimant could not necessarily bring an enforcement
action wherever assets of the debtor were found The court dis-
missed an enforcement action for lack of personal jurisdiction over
the debtor, holding that the presence within the court's jurisdic-
tion of property of the debtor unrelated to the dispute was not suf-
ficient grounds for personal jurisdiction.4 In the second decision,
Monegasque de Reassurances S.A.M. v. NAKNaftogaz of Ukraine,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
affirmed the dismissal of an action to confirm and enforce an arbi-
tration award on grounds of forum non conveniens, holding the
* Partner, Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, New York, New York. This article was
originally an oral presentation at the University of Miami Inter-American Law Review
Symposium on International Arbitration on April 2, 2004, in Miami, Florida. The
author wishes to thank Ryan Hecker, a 2004 Summer Associate at Sullivan &
Cromwell, for his invaluable assistance in the preparation of this article.
1. The three cases are: 1) Base Metal Trading, Ltd. v. OJSC "Novokuznetsky
Aluminum Factory," 283 F.3d 208 (4th Cir. 2002); Monegasque de Reassurances
S.A.M. v. NAK Naftogaz of Ukraine, 311 F.3d 488 (2d Cir. 2002); Chromalloy
Aeroservices v. Arab Republic of Egypt, 939 F. Supp. 907 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
2. Base Metal Trading, Ltd., 283 F.3d 208; Monegasque de Reassurances S.A.M.,
311 F.3d 488.
3. Base Metal Trading, Ltd., 283 F.3d at 211.
4. Id. at 214-15
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Ukraine to be a more appropriate forum for the enforcement
proceeding.
The third decision, while it was pro-enforcement, possibly
troubled international arbitration circles the most. Here the tenet
seemingly under attack was that the country in which an award is
issued has primary jurisdiction to review the award and set it
aside. In Chromalloy Aeroservices v. Arab Republic of Egypt,
decided in 1996, the United States District Court for the District
of Columbia enforced an award that had been set aside in the
country in which it was issued.6 The court's decision was so unex-
pected and unwelcomed by the international bar that it was omi-
nously dubbed the "Chromalloy Problem."7 This article seeks not
so much to address the wisdom of the decision-about which much
has been written-but rather to examine how it has fared in the
eight years since the decision was handed down.
This article examines these three cases and concludes that,
while they should reasonably cause a double-take, they do not
spell the end of international arbitration as we know it. Base
Metal Trading, Ltd. is simply a mistake, apparently prompted by
inadequate briefing. Monegasque de Reassurances S.A.M., how-
ever, was correctly decided on unusual facts. Chromalloy Aeroser-
vices appears to have been an anomaly that has been largely
confined to its facts.
JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS
In order to understand these three decisions, a brief overview
of the legal regime for the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards
is necessary. The foundation for enforcement of international arbi-
tral awards is the Convention on the Recognition and Enforce-
ment of Foreign Arbitral Awards ("New York Convention" or
"Convention").' Now ratified by 134 countries, the Convention is
the most successful multi-lateral international legal instrument
that man has devised.9 The Convention requires a ratifying state
to enforce awards issued in another ratifying state unless one of
5. Monegasque de Reassurances S.A.M., 311 F.3d 488.
6. Chromalloy Aeroservices, 939 F. Supp. 907.
7. Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Exercise of Contract Freedom in the Making of
Arbitration Agreements, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1189, 1224 (2003).
8. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38.
9. As of April, 16, 2004, 134 countries were parties to the New York Convention.
Status of Conventions and Model Laws, available at http://www.uncitral.org/en-
index.htm (last visited Oct. 28, 2004).
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seven grounds is met.10
These grounds are essentially, but not entirely, procedural.
For the most part, they provide for review to ensure that the arbi-
tral procedures used were fair, rather than providing for review of
the merits of the decision. Specifically, the grounds for refusing
enforcement under the New York Convention are found in Article
V, Section 1:
a) The parties to the [arbitration] agreement .... were,
under the law applicable to them, under some incapac-
ity, or the said agreement is not valid under the law to
which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indi-
cation thereon, under the law of the country where the
award was made; or
b) The party against whom the award is invoked was not
given proper notice of the appointment of the arbitrator
or of the arbitration proceedings or was otherwise una-
ble to present his case; or
c) The award deals with a difference not contemplated by
or not falling within the terms of the submission to
arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond
the scope of the submission to arbitration, provided
that, if the decisions on matters submitted to arbitra-
tion can be separated from those not so submitted, that
part of the award which contains decisions on matters
submitted to arbitration may be recognized and
enforced; or
d) The composition of the arbitral authority or the arbi-
tral procedure was not in accordance with the agree-
ment of the parties, or, failing such agreement, was not
in accordance with the law of the country where the
arbitration took place; or
e) The award has not yet become binding on the parties,
or has been set aside or suspended by a competent
authority of the country in which, or under the law of
which, that award was made.11
In addition, Article V, Section 2 states that recognition and
enforcement may also be refused where:
10. New York Convention, supra note 8, art. V, § 1-2.
11. New York Convention, supra note 8, art. V, § 1(a)-(e) (1959). The New York
Convention is implemented in the United States by the Federal Arbitration Act
("FAA"), 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (2003). Essentially the same grounds are provided in
the Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration ("Panama
Convention"), which has also been implemented through the FAA, 9 U.S.C.
§§ 301-307 (2003).
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a) The subject matter of the difference is not capable of
settlement by arbitration under the law of [the] country
[in which enforcement is sought]; or
b) The recognition or enforcement of the award would be
contrary to the public policy of that country.12
Alongside the regime for enforcement of foreign arbitral
awards, a separate regime exists for the enforcement of domestic
arbitral awards. One fairly widely accepted distinction between
the two regimes is that under the domestic regime, courts are gen-
erally freer to examine the merits of the tribunal's decision.13
This clear-cut bifurcation into two realms, domestic and for-
eign arbitral awards, is subject to two exceptions. First, the New
York Convention applies in certain respects not only to foreign
arbitral awards, but also to awards issued in the United States if
the arbitration involved a non-United States party, non-United
States law, performance abroad, or property located abroad. 4 Sec-
ond, under Article VII of the New York Convention, a foreign arbi-
tral award can be enforced under any more favorable regime that
may exist under domestic law of the country where recognition
and enforcement is sought. 5
12. New York Convention, supra note 8, art. V, § 2(a)-(b).
13. Enforcement of domestic awards can be refused:
(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue
means;
(2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the
arbitrators, or either of them;
(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to
postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in
refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the
controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of
any party have been prejudiced; or
(4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly
executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon
the subject matter submitted was not made.
FAA, 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1)-(4) (2003). Courts also have implied non-statutory grounds
to review the merits of domestic awards, either under an "arbitrary and capricious"
standard, see, e.g., Indus. Risk Insurers v. M.A.N. Gutehoffnungshuitte GmbH, 141
F.3d 1434, 1446 n.16 (11th Cir. 1998) (discussing the "arbitrary and capricious"
standard but refusing to apply it because it is relevant only to domestic, not foreign,
awards), or because the decision was "manifestly in disregard" of the applicable law,
see, e.g., IS Stavborg v. Nat'l Metal Converters, Inc., 500 F.2d 424, 430-31 (2d Cir.
1974) (determining that an award would only fail the "manifest disregard" test if it
was irrational, not merely erroneous).
14. 9 U.S.C. § 202 (2003). See, e.g., Yusuf Ahmed Alghanim & Sons, W.L.L. v.
Toys "IR" Us, Inc., 126 F.3d 15, 19 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding an arbitral award was non-
domestic because the dispute concerned two foreign companies principally involved in
contract performance in the Middle East).
15. New York Convention, supra note 8, art. VII (stating, in pertinent part: "The
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A key feature of the New York Convention for present pur-
poses is that it does not prescribe the procedure to be used by
national courts in considering whether to recognize or enforce an
arbitral award.16 Rather, the Convention requires only that
States enforce arbitral awards "in accordance with the rules of
procedure of the territory where the award is relied upon." 7 This
practical instruction is combined with a safeguard against dis-
crimination, specifically that a national court may not impose
"substantially more onerous conditions [on enforcement of awards
under the Convention] than are imposed on the recognition or
enforcement of domestic arbitral awards." 8
PERSONAL JURISDICTION AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF
FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS
Suppose that you are a widget maker in Xanadu with a con-
tract to sell a quantity of widgets to Coleridge Corporation in
Alph. A dispute arises, Coleridge refuses to pay, and you resort to
arbitration in London, which is successful. You have an award for
the full amount owed plus interest, but Coleridge still refuses to
pay. While Alph and Xanadu are extraordinarily beautiful places,
they are somewhat benighted from an arbitration perspective, for
neither is a party to the New York Convention. But not to worry,
you know the Convention has been widely adopted, so you have
every confidence of a quick and easy enforcement once you find
assets of Coleridge outside of Alph. This is not difficult, as you
know that Coleridge has paid other widget makers from a bank
account in Baltimore, Maryland.
You direct your United States lawyers to commence an action
to enforce the award in a Maryland federal court and issue
restraining notices on the United States bank where the account
was located. "Happy to do it," the lawyers say, "but you should be
aware of Base Metal Trading Ltd. v. OJSC "Novokuznetsky Alumi-
num Factory," a decision issued a couple of years ago by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, which hap-
pens to include Baltimore. " "
provisions of the present Convention shall not ... deprive any interested party of any
right he may have to avail himself of an arbitral award ... by the law ... of the
country where such award is sought to be relied upon.").
16. See, e.g., New York Convention, supra note 8, art. III.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Base Metal Trading, Ltd., 283 F.3d 208.
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In that case, you are told, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the dis-
missal, for lack of personal jurisdiction, of a case seeking to
enforce a foreign arbitral award. 0 The court held that, "when the
property which serves as the basis for jurisdiction is completely
unrelated to the plaintiffs cause of action, the presence of prop-
erty alone will not support jurisdiction."2' Since the aluminum
that had been attached in the Port of Baltimore was not related to
the dispute that led to the arbitration award, the attachment was
vacated.22
Any widget maker in Xanadu would be forgiven for thinking
that something's not right if you can only enforce an arbitral
award where the respondent is located or against property that is
related to the dispute. This is hardly the quick and easy enforce-
ment that the text of the New York Convention seems to promise,
and it limits the efficacy of an award in a way that most laymen
would find surprising. Once you have gone to the trouble and
expense of obtaining an arbitral award, and once the respondent
has failed to fulfill its obligation to pay the award, shouldn't you
be able to take the award anywhere you can find assets and seize
them?
If the answer for now is "no" in the Fourth Circuit, the posi-
tion elsewhere is far from clear, for the question of whether prop-
erty unrelated to the dispute can serve as a sufficient basis for
personal jurisdiction has bedeviled appellate courts across the
country in the last few years. Three weeks after the Fourth Cir-
cuit's decision in Base Metal Trading, Ltd., the Ninth Circuit
stated, in dictum, that personal jurisdiction to enforce an award
can be based on property in the forum unrelated to the underlying
controversy.2 3 Surveying the field a year later, the Second Circuit
found the question "a difficult one," and dodged it.24 In Dardana
Ltd. v. A.O. Yuganskneftegaz, the Second Circuit noted the con-
flicting Fourth and Ninth Circuit decisions, and remanded the
20. Id. at 213.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 214-15.
23. Glencore Grain Rotterdam B.V. v. Shivnath Rai Harnarain Co., 284 F.3d 1114,
1127 (9th Cir. 2002) (affirming dismissal of the action due to the fact that the plaintiff
had identified no property in the forum owned by the defendant). A New York state
appellate court has gone further, holding that no jurisdictional basis, not even
property in the jurisdiction, is required to confirm a foreign-country judgment. See
Lenchyshyn v. Pelko Elec., Inc., 723 N.Y.S.2d 285, 291 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001) (stating
that, "although defendants assert that they currently have no assets in New York,
that assertion has no relation to their jurisdictional objection").
24. Dardana Ltd. v. A.O. Yuganskneftegaz, 317 F.3d 202, 206 (2d Cir. 2003).
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case to the district court to consider whether the presence of prop-
erty alone can supply the jurisdictional basis for an action to
enforce a foreign arbitral award.25
That the appellate courts have found the question so difficult
is bewildering. More than twenty-five years ago, the United
States Supreme Court seemed to resolve the question, albeit in
dictum and in a case involving interstate judgments, not foreign
arbitral awards.26 In Shaffer v. Heitner, a case cited by each of the
federal appellate courts referred to above, the Supreme Court held
that, in general, the presence of property unrelated to the cause of
action was not sufficient to support the exercise of personal juris-
diction needed to adjudicate the merits of the dispute. 27 But in a
footnote, the Court carved out an exception for actions to enforce a
properly obtained judgment:
Once it has been determined by a court of competent juris-
diction that the defendant is a debtor of the plaintiff, there
would seem to be no unfairness in allowing an action to
realize on that debt in a State where the defendant has
property, whether or not that State would have jurisdiction
to determine the existence of the debt as an original
matter.28
After Shaffer, state courts throughout the country have regu-
larly applied "quasi in rem" jurisdiction in cases seeking to enforce
foreign-state judgments, without imposing any requirement that
the property be related to the subject matter of the dispute.29
Add to this mix the anti-discrimination provision of Article III
of the New York Convention, which bars contracting states from
imposing "substantially more onerous conditions" on the recogni-
tion or enforcement of foreign arbitral awards than those imposed
25. Id.
26. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 209 (1977).
27. The exercise of jurisdiction to determine the rights of particular parties to
particular property is called "quasi in rem" jurisdiction. Id. at 199 n.17.
28. Id. at 210 n.36.
29. See, e.g., Huggins v. Deinhard, 654 P.2d 32, 37 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982) (holding
that "quasi in rem" jurisdiction can be the basis of an action to enforce California
judgment); Bank of Babylon v. Quirk, 472 A.2d 21, 22-23 (Conn. 1984) (holding that
"in rem" jurisdiction, involving property unrelated to the claim, can be the basis of an
action to enforce a New York judgment); Tabet v. Tabet, 644 So. 2d 557, 559 (Fla. Ct.
App. 1994) (ruling that if no property is found in the state, then the court will have no
jurisdiction to enforce a California judgment); Williamson v. Williamson, 275 S.E.2d
42, 43-46 (Ga. 1981) (holding that an Arizona judgment can be enforced if property is
found in the state); First v. Montana Dep't of Soc. & Rehab. Servs., 808 P.2d 467, 474-
75 (Mont. 1991) (ruling that "quasi in rem" jurisdiction can be the basis of an action to
enforce a South Dakota child support judgment).
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on the recognition or enforcement of domestic arbitral awards,3"
and a potent argument forms that the Fourth Circuit was simply
wrong in Base Metal Trading, Ltd.
A clue to what happened is provided by a related decision by
the Third Circuit. In Base Metal Trading Ltd. v. OJSC
"Novokuznetsky Aluminum Factory," the same plaintiff sought to
enforce the same award by pursuing aluminum that had been
shipped to New Jersey. 1 In affirming the dismissal of the com-
plaint for lack of personal jurisdiction, the Third Circuit refused to
consider an argument that the presence of property in the juris-
diction was sufficient to establish "quasi in rem" jurisdiction
because the plaintiff failed to raise the argument in the district
court.32 The court commented that the plaintiff also had failed to
raise the argument before the Fourth Circuit.33 Thus, it appears
that the Fourth Circuit was led into error by an oversight on the
part of the plaintiffs counsel. 4
While the Fourth Circuit's decision is cause for concern, and
the Second Circuit's perpetuation of the error is even more trou-
blesome, in the end, these decisions appear to be traceable to inad-
equate briefing. Nothing in the constitutional limits on personal
jurisdiction provides a reason not to enforce a foreign arbitral
award in any jurisdiction in which property of the respondent can
be found, up to the limits of the property found. 5
FORUM NON CONVENIENS AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF
FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS
The second of our trio of decisions stands on a different foot-
ing, for while the result is surprising, it is probably not wrong. It
30. New York Convention, supra note 8, at art. III.
31. Base Metal Trading, Ltd. v. OJSC "Novokuznetsky Aluminum Factory," 47
Fed. Appx. 73 (3d Cir. 2002).
32. Id. at 77.
33. Id.
34. An earlier assertion of "quasi in rem" jurisdiction might not have succeeded in
any event. The Fourth Circuit said, "[I1t is not clear that the aluminum in question
belonged to [the respondent]," Base Metal Trading, Ltd., 283 F.3d at 214. In addition,
the Third Circuit reported that a court in Louisiana had found that a shipment of
aluminum attached by the plaintiff there in fact belonged to another company. Base
Metal Trading, Ltd., 47 Fed. Appx. at 75 n.2.
35. It must be borne in mind that "quasi in rem" jurisdiction provides jurisdiction
only to the extent of the property on which jurisdiction is founded. For a particularly
stark example of this limitation in action, see CME Media Enters. B.V. v. Zelezny, No.
01 Civ. 1733, 2001 WL 1035138 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2001), in which the court
confirmed a twenty-three million dollar award, but only to the extent of a five-cent
balance in a New York bank account.
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is an exceptional decision, but not because legal principles were
misapplied; the circumstances were simply very unusual.
In Monegasque de Reassurances S.A.M. v. NAK Naftogaz of
Ukraine, the Second Circuit dismissed an action to confirm and
enforce a New York Convention arbitration award on the ground
of forum non conveniens.36 Informed of this decision, our Xanadu
widget maker will wonder whether all of the money spent on the
arbitration was ill-spent. And indeed, the first reaction of most
practitioners is shock and horror, or at least a sad shake of the
head, combined with, for those from outside the United States, a
warm feeling of superiority. Here, again, is a decision that runs
counter to two basic tenets of enforcement. First, that a claimant
should be able to "follow the money," and, second, that when the
claimant finds some money, the enforcement procedure should be
quick and easy, rather than presenting needless opportunities for
procedural objections.
In fact, however, in Monegasque de Reassurances S.A.M.,
there was no money to be followed. The claimant evidently had
brought the proceeding in hopes of finding something to attach.
Insofar as the record before the appellate court revealed, however,
the claimant had not succeeded. 7 Further, the proceeding was
not going to be quick and easy, because the claimant was seeking
to enforce an award against both the respondent and a purported
alter ego. Additionally, to make things even more interesting, the
alter ego was a sovereign.
The facts were as follows: A state-owned Ukrainian pipeline
company entered into a contract to transport natural gas for a
Russian gas company. The Ukrainians were entitled to take a
percentage of the gas to pay for carrying the gas, and the Russians
claimed that the Ukrainians had skimmed a bit too much off the
top.38 An insurer in Monaco, Monegasque de Reassurances S.A.M.
("Monde Re"), had paid the extra costs and then initiated arbitra-
tion proceedings in Moscow against the Ukrainian company. 9
The Moscow arbitration panel awarded $88 million to the Rus-
sians, and the award was upheld by the Russian courts.4"
In seeking to enforce the award in New York, Monde Re for
the first time, as far as the court opinions reveal, sought to join
36. Monegasque de Reassurances S.A.M., 311 F.3d at 499.
37. Id. Or perhaps the claimant hoped to "export" a decision confirming the award
to a jurisdiction in which assets were found.
38. Id. at 491.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 491-92.
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the Ukraine to the proceeding, arguing that the country was liable
for the award as the alter ego of the pipeline company. 1 The trial
court and the Second Circuit were thus confronted with deciding
whether the Ukraine was the alter ego of the pipeline com-
pany, presumably a question of Ukrainian law, and an issue that
would likely require extensive evidence of the relationship
between the state and the pipeline company. This issue arose in a
case in which there were, as of yet, no assets to enforce against.
As the Monegasque Court stated, "[Tihis case does not lend itself
to summary disposition."42
Both courts declined to go down that path, deciding instead
that the doctrine of forum non conveniens could be applied in pro-
ceedings to enforce a foreign arbitral award under the New York
Convention and that the doctrine applied to the case before them.
The rule of forum non conveniens is a principle of discretion by
which a court may decline, "for reasons of convenience, judicial
economy and justice," to exercise jurisdiction conferred on it by
statute.43 The Second Circuit concluded that the rule was a proce-
dural rule of the forum that also applied to enforcement of domes-
tic arbitral awards.4 As such, the court held that the rule could be
applied to enforcement of foreign arbitral awards under the New
York Convention.45
The Second Circuit then affirmed the district court's conclu-
sion that the doctrine applied to the dispute between Monde Re,
Nak Naftogaz of Ukraine, and the State of Ukraine. The court
held that little deference was due to Monde Re's choice of forum,
because there was little "bona fide connection" between New York
41. Id. at 492.
42. Id. at 500.
43. Id. at 497. See also Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947). The trial
court declined to decide whether it in fact had jurisdiction, and the Second Circuit
affirmed on the same basis. The Second Circuit explained that it is proper to decline
to exercise jurisdiction without finding whether jurisdiction existed because the
abstention "is as merits-free as a finding of no jurisdiction." Monegasque de
Reassurances S.A.M., 311 F.3d at 498 (quoting In re Minister Papandreou, 139 F.3d
247, 255-56 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (footnote omitted)).
44. The Monegasque court cited Maria Victoria Naviera, S.A. v. Cementus Del
Valle, S.A., 759 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1985), to support the proposition that forum non
conveniens applied to domestic arbitration cases. Monegasque de Reassurances
S.A.M., 311 F.3d at 496. That case was likely one to which the New York Convention
applied, however, because it involved non-U.S. parties who had agreed to arbitration
in New York. It was thus a "non-domestic" case for New York Convention purposes.
See New York Convention, supra note 8, art. I ("[The Convention] shall also apply to
arbitral awards not considered as domestic awards in the State where their
recognition and enforcement are sought."). See also 9 U.S.C. § 202 (1970).
45. Monegasque de Reassurances S.A.M., 311 F.3d at 495-97.
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and either Monde Re or the lawsuit.46 The Second Circuit also
determined that an adequate alternative forum existed in the
Ukraine, finding the evidence submitted of "general corruption in
the body politic of that nation" to be insufficient.47 Indeed, the
court stated that, in voluntarily conducting business with a
Ukrainian company, "Gazprom, the Russian company ... must
have anticipated the possibility of litigation in Ukraine."48 The
court then balanced so-called "private interest factors"49 and "pub-
lic interest factors"50 to conclude that the enforcement action
should proceed in the Ukraine.
The Second Circuit's conclusion that the doctrine of forum
non conveniens applies to actions under the New York Convention
was correct, although its reasoning in places is open to question.
The court, for example, rejected Monde Re's argument that appli-
cation of the doctrine of forum non conveniens "flouts the intent of
the Convention and runs the risk of invalidating its purpose."51
Quoting the district court, the Second Circuit reasoned that
enforcing awards in jurisdictions with no connection to the par-
ties, the underlying events or the award "may be highly inconve-
nient overall and might chill international trade if the parties had
no recourse but to litigate, at any cost, enforcement of arbitral
awards in a petitioner's chosen forum." 2
The Court's conclusion is correct, but its reasoning is puz-
zling. The premise of the New York Convention is that interna-
tional trade will be furthered by making duly obtained arbitral
awards enforceable as widely as possible, even if the respondent is
required to litigate the enforceability of the dispute in numerous
forums. But the proposition offered by Monde Re-that applying
46. Id. at 498 (quoting Iragorri v. U.S. Techs. Corp., 274 F.3d 65, 72 (2nd Cir.
2001) (en banc)).
47. Id. at 499.
48. Id.
49. The "private interest factors" are "the relative ease of access to sources of
proof; availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of
obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses; possibility of view of premises, if view
would be appropriate to the action; and all other practical problems that make trial of
a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive." Id. at 500 (internal quotations omitted).
50. The "public interest factors" include "the administrative difficulties associated
with court congestion; the imposition of jury duty upon those whose community bears
no relationship to the litigation; the local interest in resolving local disputes; and the
problems implicated in the application of foreign law." Id. at 500 (internal quotations
omitted).
51. Id. at 496.
52. Id. at 497 (quoting In re Arbitration Between Monegasque de Reassurance,
S.A.M. v. Nak Naftogaz of Ukraine, 158 F. Supp. 2d 377, 383 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)).
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neutral procedures in such a way that enforcement is thwarted
would undermine the New York Convention-was properly
rejected.53 The Convention does not instruct courts to apply only
"enforcement-enhancing" procedures. That the doctrine of forum
non conveniens results in denial of enforcement is no more a viola-
tion of the Convention than application of statutes of limitation or
rules that require a petitioner to proceed only with a properly
appointed lawyer or in a court with the correct jurisdictional
limits.5 4
It might be argued that the doctrine of forum non conveniens
is not a facially neutral procedural rule, but in fact applies more
severely to foreign arbitral awards because it always will be sub-
stantially more onerous to be forced to litigate in another country
than in another state of the United States. By definition, how-
ever, the doctrine applies when the connections with the forum
are far less than with one or more alternative forums.55 The pre-
mise of the "private interest factors" to be considered in applying
forum non conveniens is that the litigation will be more readily
conducted elsewhere than in the United States.
Applying forum non conveniens to foreign arbitral awards is
thereby not a misstep, as the Fourth Circuit decision in Base
Metal Trading, Ltd. was, but it is critical that the doctrine con-
tinue to be applied with care. While I do not propose to offer any
conclusion as to whether the trial court and the Second Circuit
were right or wrong in applying the doctrine on the record before
them, I make three observations:
First, the Second Circuit was surely wrong in saying that
Gazprom "must have anticipated the possibility of litigation in
Ukraine."56 In signing a contract calling for arbitration in Mos-
cow, Gazprom did everything it could to avoid litigation in the
Ukraine. Using a business deal with a Ukrainian company as an
endorsement of the Ukrainian court system was wrong.
Second, there is more than a hint of forum-shopping here.
Courts in the United States will undoubtedly be more receptive to
53. Monegasque de Reassurances S.A.M., 311 F.3d at 499.
54. Indeed, the United States Supreme Court had said that the doctrine of forum
non conveniens is "nothing more or less than a supervening venue provision." Am.
Dredging v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 453 (1994).
55. See, e.g., Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (ruling that because
.plaintiffs choice of forum should rarely be disturbed," forum non conveniens should
only be applied when the balance of the private interest factors is "strongly in favor"
of the defendant's claim of inconvenience).
56. Monegasque de Reassurances S.A.M., 311 F.3d at 499.
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an alter ego argument than courts in almost any other country.
This was a factor that evidently and properly weighed heavily in
the conclusion in Monegasque de Reassurances S.A.M.
Third, while Monegasque produced good law, it was nonethe-
less a hard case.57 Courts should apply the doctrine of forum non
conveniens sparingly and take note of the highly unusual facts in
the Monegasque case, principally the apparent absence of assets
in the forum and the complexity occasioned by the introduction of
the alter ego issue at the enforcement stage. The presence in the
forum of attachable assets likely owned by the defendant should
almost always, if not always, be a sufficient connection to the
forum to justify the exercise of jurisdiction, even in an alter ego
case. Additionally, if an action to enforce is nonetheless dismissed
on grounds of forum non conveniens, the court should usually con-
dition dismissal on posting of security substantially equal to any
assets properly attached.58
THE CHROMALLOY PROBLEM
Thus far, I have presented. ways in which United States
courts have chosen not to enforce arbitral awards. The "Chromal-
loy Problem" refers to the opposite concern: expanding the power
of plaintiffs to what some considered an alarming degree. 9
In Chromalloy, the D.C. Circuit enforced an award that had
been set aside in the country that issued it. The case involved an
award rendered in Egypt against the Egyptian Air Force and in
favor of an American company. ° The arbitration clause provided
that the award would not be subject to any appeal or other
recourse, but the Egyptian Air Force nonetheless sought to have
the award set aside by the Egyptian courts.6 1 The Egyptian judici-
ary obliged, setting aside the award on the ground that the arbi-
trators had misapplied Egyptian law.62
Undaunted, the American company sought to confirm the
57. Cf. Northern Secs. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) (noting that, "Great cases like hard cases make bad law.").
58. E.g., Iberian Tankers Co. v. Terminales Maracaibo, C.A., 322 F. Supp. 73, 75
n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (dismissing suit to compel arbitration on forum non conveniens
grounds on condition that defendant post security in the amount of funds attached).
59. Chromalloy Aeroservices v. Arab Republic of Egypt, 939 F. Supp. 907 (D.C.
Cir. 1996).
60. Id. at 908.
61. Id.
62. Id. A speaker at an earlier arbitration symposium at the University of Miami
has suggested that the Egyptian court's evaluation of the arbitrators' interpretation
of law was "strained" and that the protection of national interests might have been at
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award in the United States. Under Article V of the New York
Convention, the District of Columbia District Court could have
refused to enforce the award because one of the grounds for deny-
ing enforcement is that the award has been set aside in the coun-
try in which it was issued." The United States court, however,
confirmed the award, holding that the fact that the Egyptian court
set aside the award only meant that a court was not required to
enforce the award under Article V of the New York Convention,
not that foreign enforcement was prohibited.' Moreover, since
Article VII of the Convention required a court to enforce a foreign
award if it would be enforced under domestic law, the D.C. Dis-
trict Court ruled that, under Article VII of the Convention, it was
authorized to enforce the award because Chapter 1 of the Federal
Arbitration Act required confirmation under the circumstances.6"
The concern with Chromalloy is that it departs from the prin-
ciple that the courts, at the place of arbitration, have primary
jurisdiction over awards issued within their jurisdiction. If an
award can be revived after its judicial nullification, a claimant
with an annulled award tucked under its arm could go from coun-
try to country, like the ghouls in Night of the Living Dead,66 until
it found a court willing to enforce the award. Moreover, the
court's interpretation of Article V of the New York Convention was
said to provide the enforcing court with effectively unlimited dis-
cretion to enforce faulty arbitration awards as long as its ruling
also applied to the enforcement of domestic awards.6"
As it turns out, none of this appears to have come to pass, at
least in United States courts. In the eight years since the Chro-
malloy case was decided, there have been three published deci-
sions in the United States that have expressly considered whether
to follow Chromalloy in applying Chapter 1 of the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act to confirm an award governed by the New York Conven-
the forefront of the Egyptian court's mind. See Thomas M. Carbonneau, The Ballad of
Transborder Arbitration, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 773, 792 (2002).
63. New York Convention, supra note 8, art. V(1)(e).
64. Chromalloy, 939 F. Supp. 2d at 909.
65. See New York Convention, supra note, 8 art. VII.
66. NIGHT OF THE LIVING DEAD (Continental/Image Ten Productions 1968).
67. See, e.g., Christopher R. Drahozal, Enforcing Vacated International
Arbitration Awards: An Economic Approach, 11 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 451, 462 (2000)
(explaining that in a system where a vacated award cannot be enforced in another
jurisdiction, "a party cannot shop around the world in order to find a flexible court
somewhere which is willing to enforce such [a questionable] award") (quoting Albert
Jan van den Berg, Enforcement of Annulled Awards?, 9 I.C.C. INT'L CT. ARB. BULL. 15
(Nov. 1998)).
68. Carbonneau, supra note 7, at 1225.
2004] CURRENT ISSUES IN ENFORCEMENT 37
tion. None of the courts found grounds for applying the
Chromalloy reasoning.
The Second Circuit refused to apply Chromalloy in Baker
Marine (Nig.) Ltd. v. Chevron (Nig.) Ltd., where Nigerian courts
had set aside a Nigerian arbitration ruling in favor of Baker
Marine against Chevron Corp. and another company in disputes
relating to an agreement for provision of barge services to Chev-
ron. 9 The New York court broadly rejected the policy basis of
Chromalloy. The Second Circuit stated that "as a practical mat-
ter, mechanical application of domestic arbitral law to foreign
awards under the Convention would seriously undermine finality
and regularly produce conflicting judgments."" The court ulti-
mately distinguished Chromalloy on narrower grounds, however,
noting that Baker Marine was not a United States "citizen" and
that the case did not involve a breach of a promise not to appeal
the arbitral award.7
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York likewise refused to follow Chromalloy in Spier v. Calza-
turificio Tecnica, S.p.A.7 2 That case involved an arbitral award
rendered in Italy in favor of an American citizen against an Ital-
ian company. The United States court initially stayed the pro-
ceeding to confirm or enforce the award pending set-aside
proceedings in Italy.7 The Italian courts, both trial and appellate,
set aside the award, holding, in essence, that the arbitrators had
misused their power to issue an award "pro bono et aequo," in
awarding a sum entirely outside the bounds of the contract." The
claimant renewed his United States court petition to confirm or
enforce the award, but the American court rejected the petition,
relying on Baker Marine.7 While the plaintiff in Spier was a U.S.
citizen, unlike the plaintiff in Baker Marine, the New York court
held that the "decisive circumstance" prompting the ruling in
Baker Marine was "Egypt's repudiation of its contractual promise
not to appeal an arbitral award."76
69. Baker Marine (Nig.) Ltd. v. Chevron (Nig.) Ltd., 191 F.3d 194 (2d Cir. 1999).
70. Id. at 197 n.2 (quoting Albert Jan van den Berg, The New York Arbitration
Convention of 1958: Towards a Uniform Judicial Interpretation 355 (1981)).
71. Baker Marine, 191 F.3d at 197 n.3.
72. Spier v. Calzaturificio Tecnica, S.p.A., 71 F. Supp. 2d 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
73. Spier v. Calzatorificio Tecnica S.p.A., 663 F. Supp. 871, 875-76 (S.D.N.Y.
1987). Article VI of the New York Convention provides for a stay pending completion
of a set-aside proceeding in the country in which the award was issued.
74. Spier, 71 F. Supp. 2d at 281-82.
75. Id. at 288.
76. Id. at 287.
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Finally, the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Florida rejected Chromalloy's view that the domestic
grounds for enforcement in Chapter 1 of the Federal Arbitration
Act can apply to arbitral awards to which the New York Conven-
tion applies. In Four Seasons Hotels and Resorts, B.V. v. Con-
sorcio Barr, S.A., the Florida court was asked to confirm an award
made in the United States and not a foreign award.7 Because the
award was based on foreign law and was issued in a dispute
between foreign parties, however, the court concluded that the
award was "not considered . . . domestic" and was thereby gov-
erned by the New York Convention, as implemented in Chapter 2
of the Federal Arbitration Act.7 The Florida court read Chromal-
loy as calling for application of the domestic enforcement grounds
in Chapter 1 to determine whether to confirm such an award and
rejected that conclusion. The court ruled that, notwithstanding
the language of Article VII of the New York Convention, the Fed-
eral Arbitration Act does not contemplate "the wholesale exclusion
of Chapter 2 of the FAA in favor of Chapter 1." The Florida court
reasoned:
[D]espite the Chromalloy court's conclusion that no conflict
exists between Chapter 1 and the Convention,.. . its hold-
ing implies that article VII of the Convention allows the
wholesale exclusion of Chapter 2 of the FAA in favor of
Chapter 1. Even if this was the intent of the Convention, 9
U.S.C. § 208 limits the ability to make this type of substitu-
tion. Nothing in Individual Risk Insurers [v. M.A.N.
Gutehoffnungshutte, 141 F.3d 1434 (11th Cir. 1998), an ear-
lier appellate decision,] or 9 U.S.C. § 208 indicates that
Chapter 1 is capable of serving as the primary framework
for confirming an award "not considered as domestic" under
the Convention, as Chromalloy suggests.8 "
The issue in Four Seasons-the standards to apply in con-
firming an award issued in the United States-is quite different
from the question presented in Chromalloy, Baker Marine and
Spier. In the latter three cases, the issue was whether to enforce
an award issued elsewhere after it had been set aside in its coun-
77. Four Seasons Hotels & Resorts, B.V. v. Consorcio Barr, S.A., 267 F. Supp. 2d
1335, 1341-42 (S.D. Fla. 2003).
78. Id. at 1342.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1341-42. 9 U.S.C. § 208, to which the court referred, states, "Chapter 1
applies to actions and proceedings brought under this chapter to the extent that
chapter is not in conflict with this chapter or the [New York] Convention as ratified by
the United States." 9 U.S.C. § 208 (2003).
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try of origin. Indeed, the Second Circuit, the court that refused to
follow Chromalloy in the Baker Marine case, reached a different
conclusion and applied the domestic grounds in deciding whether
to set aside a "non-domestic" award issued in the United States.8'
The sweeping rejection, however, of the fundamental premises of
Chromalloy in Four Seasons and Baker Marine is telling. The
U.S. courts that have addressed Chromalloy have not embraced
the case and appear to be concerned about the implications that
many in the arbitration world feared: both the lack of finality and
the risk of conflicting judgments.
The question that arises is whether a court confronted with a
breach of a promise not to appeal an arbitral award, as the Chro-
malloy court was, will follow that case. I suggest that it will not.
The fundamental proposition that appears to animate each of
these post-Chromalloy decisions is that the state in which an
award was issued, which was generally chosen by the parties, has
primary jurisdiction to consider whether to set aside the award. If
those courts do not hold a party to its promise not to appeal an
award, then it is unlikely that another United States court will
enforce that undertaking.
CONCLUSION
The three recent enforcement decisions I have considered are
each surprising, but they are not causes for despair. Monegasque
de Reassurances S.A.M., which applied forum non conveniens to
dismiss an enforcement proceeding, was doctrinally correct, but
involved extreme circumstances unlikely to be often repeated,
namely the absence of assets in the forum. Base Metal Trading,
Ltd., which dismissed an enforcement proceeding for lack of per-
sonal jurisdiction notwithstanding the apparent presence of the
debtor's property in the jurisdiction, was wrongly decided. The
result in that case was apparently the product of poor briefing.
Finally, Chromalloy, which enforced an award that had been set
aside in the country of origin, seems to be increasingly confined to
its facts. The machinery of enforcement of arbitral awards in the
United States is not broken. It is just, as the common law always
has been, a bit creaky.
81. Yusef Ahmed Alghanim & Sons, W.L.L. v. Toys "R" Us, Inc., 126 F.3d 15 (2d
Cir. 1997). "We read Article V(1)(e) of the Convention to allow a court in the country
under whose law the arbitration was conducted to apply domestic arbitral law, in this
case [Chapter 1 of] the FAA, to a motion to set aside or vacate that arbitral award."
Id. at 21.
